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Abstract: 
Potential civil applications of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly known as drones, have risen steeply during 
the last decade, mainly due to their versatility and capability of spatial data gathering. Nonetheless, real use of UAS is 
quite restricted nowadays, primarily due to safety and regulatory constraints. This multidisciplinary project aims to perform 
specific safety assessments using the SORA methodology adopted by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and 
develop documentation and procedures for operators to follow, complying with all required safety and regulatory 
requirements. As a result, DEURPAS-UPV is the first Spanish drone operator belonging to a university to be authorized 
by Spanish civil aviation agency (AESA-Agencia Estatal de Seguridad Aérea), to perform drone flights in urban areas, in 
controlled airspace and during the night. In addition, DEURPAS-UPV has performed the first authorized experimental 
transport operations using drones in Spain. The results from safety assessment and designed procedures have been 
successfully applied to the operation of Safety and Emergency service providers, such as Valencia Local Police Corps and 
the Valencian Emergency and Safety Response Agency (AVSRE - Agencia Valenciana de Seguridad y Respuesta a las 
Emergencias). Overall, this project has served as an enabler for more complex and safer UAS operations, from the 
operator’s point of view, which will help break the barriers related to the use of these aircraft, with huge potential in 
geomatics applications. 
Key words: UAS, drone, Geomatics, SORA, Operational safety, Emergency 
Resumen:  
Las aplicaciones civiles de los sistemas aéreos no tripulados (UAS), comúnmente conocidos como drones, han aumentado 
considerablemente durante la última década, principalmente debido a su versatilidad y capacidad de recopilación de datos 
espaciales. Sin embargo, el uso real de los UAS está bastante restringido hoy en día, principalmente debido a las 
restricciones de seguridad y legislativas. Este proyecto multidisciplinar tiene como objetivo realizar evaluaciones de 
seguridad específicas utilizando la metodología SORA adoptada por la Agencia Europea de Seguridad Aérea (EASA) y 
desarrollar documentación y procedimientos para que los operadores los sigan, cumpliendo con todos los requisitos de 
seguridad y normativos exigidos. Como resultado, DEURPAS-UPV es el primer operador español de drones perteneciente 
a una universidad que ha sido autorizado por la Agencia Estatal de Seguridad Aérea (AESA), para realizar vuelos con 
drones en zonas urbanas, en espacio aéreo controlado y durante la noche. Además, DEURPAS-UPV ha realizado las 
primeras operaciones experimentales de transporte con drones autorizadas en España. Los resultados de la evaluación 
de seguridad y los procedimientos diseñados se han aplicado con éxito a la operación de proveedores de servicios de 
Seguridad y Emergencias, como el Cuerpo de Policía Local de Valencia y la Agencia Valenciana de Segurida y Respuesta 
a las Emergencias (AVSRE). En general, este proyecto ha servido para facilitar operaciones con UAS más complejas y 
seguras, desde el punto de vista del operador, lo que ayudará a romper las barreras relacionadas con el uso de estas 
aeronaves, con un enorme potencial en aplicaciones geomáticas. 
Palabras clave: UAS, dron, Geomática, SORA, Seguridad operacional, Emergencia 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last few years, the civil use of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS), commonly named drones, has increased 
considerably thanks to its great potential and versatility. 
The ability of UAS to carry a wide assortment of sensing 
equipment and reach hard to access areas has prompted 
their adoption in varied professional fields, such as public 
safety (Cerreta et al. 2020), environment monitoring 
(Gonçalves et al. 2020) or construction safety (Rodrigues 
and Bastos 2019). 
Among the various sciences in which UAS are currently 
being integrated, it is important to highlight the role of 
Geomatics. This transversal science brings together a 
multitude of disciplines such as photogrammetry, 
geomorphology, precision agriculture, mapping, or 
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heritage conservation, among others, which use 
geospatial data as main input. Colomina and Molina 
(2014) review UAS applications focused on 
photogrammetry and remote sensing, where UAS allow 
to increase the accuracy of work and simplify the data 
collection process, even replacing traditional instruments 
in some cases. 
However, UAS operation comes not without risk. In case 
of malfunction or mishap, UAS are capable of producing 
severe injuries to hit people, or even fatalities. Duma et 
al. (2021) studied the possible harm caused by drone 
blades. In addition, the airspace is already populated with 
another aircraft, which have very specific and demanding 
requirements related to their design, production, and 
operation. Research has been performed regarding the 
integration of UAS in a non-segregated airspace, 
considering separation procedures and mid-air collision 
(MAC) risk (Clothier et al. 2015; Guan et al. 2020). 
Spencer’s (2018) review highlighted that a catastrophic 
accident caused by UAS would pose as a great threat to 
the drone industry, according to operator’s point of view. 
Because of these safety concerns, as well as the public 
perception that is linked to them, drone regulations 
around the globe, which were nonexistent until the civil 
use of UAS flourished, have been very strict. 
UAS operations are generally only permitted in a given 
set of scenarios and specific permissions are generally 
needed, until the safety of more complex operations can 
be guaranteed. According to Rango and Liberte (2010), 
strict regulations limit the range and type of operations to 
be performed, as well as increasing the workload of 
operators due to the authorization and registry 
procedures that must be followed. 
During the last years, many authors have proposed risk 
assessment models to address the risk posed by UAS 
operations. Luxhøj (2015) proposed the use of ASRM 
(Aviation System Risk Model) to address the MAC 
chance, as well as the probability of conflict with other 
aircraft. Fang et al. (2018) proposed an UAS architecture 
to enable safer operations beyond line of sight of the pilot. 
Hammer et al. (2017) presents a failure tree model to 
assess UAS risk. 
All these methodologies have a common point: they are 
heavily focused on the aircraft, not giving much 
importance to the operational environment. Looking for a 
more holistic approach, JARUS proposed the SORA 
(Specific Operations Risk Assessment) methodology, 
which is operation centric. SORA allows the assessment 
of an operation’s risk based on its ConOps (the 
description of the operations parameter’s) rather than 
focusing on the actual aircraft model used. As output, a 
given set of mitigation measures that would reduce risk to 
an acceptable level is identified. SORA has been 
accepted as a standard methodology to assess UAS 
operations risk, adopted by the European Union. 
However, its use is not straightforward. Research papers 
have been publishing regarding the application of SORA 
to a given ConOps (Capitan et al. 2019), while others 
focus on how to actually achieve compliance with 
mitigation measures identified by SORA (Cain et al. 
2021). Given that SORA is still in development, others 
efforts are made to improve it, such as Denney et al. 
(2018) who propose a more cuantitative approach to 
SORA process, which is for the moment based on a 
qualitative approach. 
The objective of this paper is to break the regulatory 
barrier that limits the use of UAS in R&D operations, 
specially in the field of geomatics. For that purpose, the 
risk of operations of interest will be assessed using a 
strandardized model. Using the risk assessment result as 
an input, an operator procedimental and documentary 
model, compliant with applicable regulation, will be 
developed, in order to obtain the required authorizations 
to perform desired operations. After obtaining the 
authorization, the model has been applied to real life 
operators, and flights have been performed in scenarios 
that would otherwise not be possible. 
The structure of this paper goes as follows: in section 2 
we explain the UAS regulatory frame, and in section 3 we 
describe the operator model developed to comply with 
these regulations. Section 4 details the implementation of 
the model in real remote operators. In section 5 we 
discuss the results we obtained, and section 6 contains a 
brief conlusion and highlights future work lines. 
2. UAS regulatory frame 
In this section we will briefly explain the evolution of the 
regulatory frame for UAS in Spain, including the currently 
in force European regulation, focusing on the 
requirements for operators and the allowed flight 
conditions. 
2.1. Ley 18/2014 
UAS regulation in Spain was unexistent until ‘Ley 
18/2014’, which, among a set of measures to improve 
economic competitivity, included a single article detailing 
the approved conditions for UAS operations, which would 
be in force until a UAS specific regulation was published. 
The set conditions were quite restrictive, only allowing 
operations to be performed in very low risk scenarios, 
such as rural areas in uncontrolled airspace. Flight was 
limited to Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) conditions, with the 
exception of aircraft lighter than 2 kg operating under 
NOTAM (a public notice to other airspace users). In 
addition, this law required operators to perform safety 
assessments and to have an Operating Manual (OM), 
even if the operation’s risk was low. 
2.2. Real Decreto 1036/2017 
The first Spanish specific regulation for UAS was 
published by the end of 2017, under the name of ‘Real 
Decreto 1036/2017’. 
The basic aspects from previous regulation are largely 
kept (limited operational conditions and requierements for 
the operators) for entities operating under an operational 
declaration. In addition, a new set of operational 
scenarios is allowed under an authorization from Spanish 
Civil Aviation Agency, AESA, after checking a set of 
documents provided by the operator. These scenarios 
included night flight, urban operations and flight in 
controlled airspace, widening the UAS use possibilities. In 
addition, operations Beyond Visual Line of Sight of the 
pilot (BVLOS) for aircraft heavier than 2 kg were possible 
under an authorization, given they were performed in 
segregated airspace or the aircraft equipped approved 
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Detect & Avoid means. Transport operations were not 
allowed under normal circumstances. In addition, general 
exceptions are considered for police operators, and minor 
exceptions exist for operations performed during public 
emergency, allowing a less restricted use in case of need. 
The methodology proposed by JARUS for assessing UAS 
risk operations, SORA, was adopted as the Acceptable 
Means of Compliance (AMC) to perform safety 
assessments when applying for an authorization. 
Operations performed in controlled airspace required the 
coordination of the safety assessment with the 
designated Air Transit Service Provider (ATSP). 
However, the authorization procedure was very strict, 
designed in accordance to manned aviation safety 
culture. As a result, the number of authorized operators 
was low. According to AESA publication of declared 
operators and authorizations, by the end of 2019 only 
about 0.5% of declared operators had been granted an 
authorization. 
2.3. EU UAS regulation 
During the last few years, the European Aviation Safety 
Agency, EASA, has been actively working on the 
development of a common regulatory frame for all 
Member States (MS), which entried into force on 
December 31, 2020. 
This regulatory frame is defined as operation-centric and 
risk-based, and clearly differences operational limitations 
and requirements for operators based upon the risk of the 
operations, which are classified as Open, Specific or 
Certified, according to increasing level of risk. 
Under this regulatory frame, operator requirements are 
directly proportional to the operation category. In Open, 
operators do not need operational declarations nor 
authorizations to operate, and no OM is required, but 
operations are limited to VLOS conditions under a set of 
three subcategories, allowing a restricted use in urban 
scenarios. 
The scope of Specific category is much wider, where 
lower-risk, standardized operations can be performed 
under an operational declaration, and more complex 
operations are subject of an authorization from the 
competent authority. Examples of operations performed 
under an authorization include key expected commercial 
operations, such as BVLOS delivery over urban areas. All 
operators performing flights in Specific category are 
required to have an OM, which will be checked by the 
competent authority upon authorization application, along 
with an operational risk assessment performed using 
SORA methodology. 
Current regulation focused on Open and Specific 
categories. Detailed regulation regarding Certified 
category is expected to be published during the following 
years. Certified category roughly corresponds to high-risk 
operations such as transport of people, overflight of 
assemblies of people (except for very small aircraft) or 
transport of dangerous goods. 
3. Development of UAS operator model 
In this research, we have developed a UAS operator 
model compliant to the requirements of regulations 
RD1036 and the recent EU regulation. 
However, the process we followed is not a straightforward 
interpretation of the regulations. Instead, we took the 
safety approach, and we leveraged the early adoption of 
SORA methodology by AESA as cornerstone, using the 
output from SORA to establish the foundations of the 
operator structure. 
3.1. Use of SORA methodology 
SORA, standing for Specific Operations Risk 
Assessment, is a methodology developed by JARUS to 
evaluate the risk of operations, using a ConOps (the 
operating scenario) as input. The SORA process 
identifies ground and air scenarios based on standardized 
categories with an assigned intrinsic risk level, named 
GRC (Ground Risk Class) and ARC (Air Risk Class) 
respectively. Optional mitigation measures can be 
considered to reduce GRC (e.g., the use of a parachute) 
and/or ARC (e.g., operating in time frames when air traffic 
is lower). Then, tactical mitigations to address the residual 
risk are accounted for, whose nature depends on the 
operation being performed in VLOS or BVLOS conditions. 
A SAIL (Specific Assurance & Integrity Levels) value is 
obtained from the combination of final GRC and ARC 
levels. The SAIL value is an identifier of the overall risk 
level of the operation, being I-II considered as low risk, III-
IV medium risk and V-VI high risk. Directly linked to the 
SAIL value, a set of threat mitigation measures, named 
OSOs (Operational Safety Objectives) is identified. 
Depending to the level of robustness (low-medium-high) 
required for each of the 24 OSOs (increasing with SAIL), 
a set of requirements must be fulfilled. In addition, 
considerations regarding adjacent air and ground areas 
are taken into account, addressing the possibility of a 
containment failure (i.e., the aircraft flying outside of the 
approved operational volume). 
Demostrating compliance with higher-than-two SAIL 
values requires fulfilment of medium to high robustness 
measures, which are related to very demanding 
aeronautical standards, generically out of the generic 
UAS operator’s reach. Terkildsen and Jensen (2019) 
assessed compliance of several DJI (the main civil UAS 
manufacturer worldwide) models, none of them 
complying with SAIL II requirements without the need to 
perform additional activities. Thus, a set of ConOps 
limited to SAIL II value was designed, in order to cover 
most of the intended operations. 
Scenarios intrinsically linked to SAIL II, without the 
application of reductions to GRC and/or ARC, are very 
limited (e.g., rural areas and uncontrolled airspace). Thus, 
to achieve a low SAIL value with a greater set of 
scenarios, we took the following approach: first we 
identified applications of interes, both in geomatics and 
other fields of interes, then we assessed ground and air 
scenarios for these applications and finally we considered 
the required mitigations that would lower GRC and/or 
ARC so the final SAIL result is II in these scenarios. 
Applications of interest are: photogrammetry, precision 
agriculture, mapping, heritage, inspections, cadastre, civil 
engineering, multimedia productions, police operations, 
firefighting, search and rescue, and medical 
emergencies. While operations related to agriculture, 
firefighting or search and rescue are mostly expected to 
be performed in rural areas, the rest are expected to be 
performed equally in both urban or rural areas. Regarding 
the air scenario, both uncontrolled or controlled airspace 
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can be found, not depending on the nature of the 
application but in the specific geographic area it is being 
performed. 
To cover all these scenarios, we considered the riskier 
option, urban scenario in controlled airspace, and then 
assessed the required mitigations that would lower GRC 
and/or ARC so the final SAIL result is II. If demonstration 
of compliance with the combination of these mitigations is 
feasible with reasonable means, which worked for VLOS 
operations, then the ConOps is closed. However, 
scenarios such as BVLOS operations over urban areas 
inside controlled airspace, are linked to a high intrinsic risk 
and the demonstration of compliance with measures to 
reduce risk to SAIL II level is similar in complexity to 
achieving compliance with higher-than-two SAIL, which 
had already been deemed unfeasible for the time being. 
In these cases, instead of applying reduction of GRC 
and/or ARC, the base scenario was modified via the 
deployment of ground-controlled areas and/or segregated 
airspace, so that no people on the ground or other air 
traffics are allowed, respectively. This way, risk reduction 
is achieved via completely removing the threat, at the cost 
of increased operation planning complexity. 
As reference material to perform the safety assessments, 
we used the AMC developed by AESA, named Apéndice 
S. Following the established procedure meant a separate 
authorization process was needed for each scenario, 
which implied a heavy workload for operators, ATSPs and 
also AESA. 
Thus, a different approach to apply SORA methodology 
was proposed: instead of considering a single and 
specific ConOps, we would consider all the possible 
permutations of a closed set of scenarios. This is feasible 
because all these scenarios have a common point: an 
output of SAIL II and the same linked OSO robustness 
requirements. This way, a safety assessment considering 
VLOS operations, either in rural or urban areas, in 
controlled or uncontrolled airspace and during the day or 
night was developed. The assessment was expanded in 
comparison to a traditional SORA assessment, via the 
clear definition of the mitigation measures to be applied in 
any of seven permutations of the ConOps, having a 
common SAIL and OSO output. Note that the eighth 
possible option, the combination of rural areas and 
uncontrolled airspace, during the day, was ignored as 
those operations would not require an authorization 
process via SORA assessment. 
Thus, the OSOs requirements for SAIL II were identified 
as the foundations for the operator documentation pack 
that defines the operator management model. Of the 24 
OSOs identified by SORA, 14 require a low level of 
robustness, 4 a medium level of robustness (all related to 
operational procedures) and the rest are optional. 
3.2. Operator documentation pack 
Real Decreto 1036/2017 states that operators need to 
provide a given set of documents when applying for an 
authorization. AESA developed a set of AMC and 
Guidance Material (GM) regarding the reference contents 
for each of these documents. 
We assessed the 18 OSOs to decide in which of these 
documents should the requirements materialize, either 
using the same structure provided by AMC/GM or 
expanding it as necessary. 
In order to properly manage the remote operator 
activities, it was decided that its structure should be 
divided in three sections: operations acts as the main one, 
focused on flight planning and execution, while 
maintenance section is responsible for all aircraft and 
other equipment to be in adequate conditions. Finally, 
training section shall monitor remote pilots (and other 
relevant crew) qualification, ensuring their competence is 
fit for any operation to be performed. Each section uses a 
main document as reference, auxiliary documents and a 
registry, and a responsible person is assigned to assure 
relevant tasks are performed, as seen in Table 1. In case 
of small remote operators, responsible functions can be 
shared by the same person, although it is not 
recommended. 
Table 1: Organizational scheme of a UAS operator. 





















3.3. Adoption of the EU model 
The EU regulatory frame establishes different 
requirements for operators depending on the operations’ 
category. As Open does not impose any relevant 
requirements to operators and Certified is still in 
development, we have focused on adapting to Specific 
category, where most commercial applications are 
expected. 
Both Specific category and previous Spanish regulation 
consider a mix of declaration/authorization for operations, 
following similar procedures. In addition, SORA is 
adopted by both regulations, the reason why SORA was 
used as the cornerstone of the model. This way, 
adaptation can be performed with minimum effort. 
However, EU regulatory frame does not require operators 
to have the documentation pack that we developed, only 
referencing an OM. Thus, we decided to fuse all the 
previous documents into a single OM, whose contents 
were arranged in Parts A, B, C and D (General, Aircraft, 
ConOps and Training) in a very similar fashion to how 
traditional manned aviation OM are structured. 
4. Implementation of the operator model 
In parallel to the development of the model, it was 
gradually implemented in real remote operators, both our 
operator, DEURPAS-UPV, and public safety and 
emergency operators, who were considered as prioritary 
users. 
4.1. DEURPAS-UPV 
In order to validate the developed model, a first 
authorization was applied for, with a relatively simple 
ConOps: night flights for R&D purposes. After a few 
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rounds of polishing based on AESA feedback regarding 
aspects to be corrected, an authorization was issued in 
November 2019, thus validating the first iteration of the 
model. 
A second authorization application is performed shortly 
after, using the updated model with the multiple-ConOps 
SORA assessment, which had been previously 
coordinated and agreed upon with relevant ATSPs 
(ENAIRE, SAERCO and FerroNATS). After remediation 
of minor discrepancies, the authorization was granted by 
the end of March 2020, fully validating the proposed 
model. 
Under the scope of these authorizations, our operator was 
capable to perform a wider variety of R&D operations. 
However, some operations considered prioritary, such as 
medical delivery, were still not possible because of 
regulatory constraints. For that reason, another 
authorization process was started, this time focusing on 
applying for exemptions regarding experimental transport 
flights. Note that the difference between R&D operations 
and experimental flights and is subtle: the objective of the 
former is to capture a set of data (e.g., geospatial 
information) and perform R&D activities based on that 
dataset, while the latter aim to test the way the flights are 
performed to develop new kinds of operations. This way, 
safety assessments for BVLOS delivery operations in 
urban areas were performed, considering controlled 
ground areas and segregated airspace, and an 
authorization was applied for. In November 2020, we 
performed the first experimental flights of this kind in 
Spain. More information regarding this particular set of 
flights is detailed in Quintanilla et al. (2021). 
By May 2021, thanks to the granted authorizations, 
DEURPAS-UPV has performed over 70 operations in 
complex scenarios. A small relevant set of these 
operations is detailed in Table 2. 





05/10/2020 Night – Controlled 
Airspace – Urban – Street 
lighting inspection 
DJI Mavic 2 
Enterprise 
16/11/2020 Controlled Airspace – 
Urban – Transport 
DJI Matrice 
300 RTK 
28/03/2021 Controlled Airspace – 
Photogrammetry 
DJI Mavic 2 
Enterprise 
26/04/2021 Controlled Airspace – 
Urban – Heritage 
Inspection 
DJI Mavic 2 
Enterprise 
 
As a graphical example of these flights, Figure 1 
corresponds to an aerial image of the tower of Santa 
Catalina’s Church, in Valencia. The objective of this flight 
was to assess the level of luminic impact of the new public 
lighting. 
In April 2021, operations were performed over Santo 
Domingo Convent, to assess deterioration of windows 
and roof tiles, as well as the location of a dove flock that 
had nested inside the dome, endangering art pieces 
inside the facility (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 1: Public light inspection at Santa Catalina's Church, 
Valencia 
 
Figure 2: Detail view of the dome of the Santo Domingo 
Convent, Valencia for heritage inspection. 
4.2. Safety and emergency operators 
In parallel to the validation of the operator model, it was 
distributed to public safety and emergency entities, such 
as the Valencian Agency for Safety and Emergency 
Response (AVSRE) and the local Police Corps of 
Valencia, and the nearby settlements of Algemesí, 
Almussafes, Bétera, Culllera, Nules, Picassent, Vall 
d’Uxò and Xàtiva. 
Although Police Corps are exempt from any authorization, 
and AVSRE used an exemption when operating in public 
emergency situations, their operations must indeed be 
performed in safety conditions, considering the 
appropriate safety mitigation measures. This way, the 
operator model acts as an underlying way to guarantee 
the safety of these operations. 
5. Discussion 
The conservative approach followed by approved 
regulations, based on aeronautical standards has been 
an obstacle for the development of UAS operations. 
However, this has also had a positive effect in safety with 
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no major UAS incidents reported in Spain during these 
years. 
Evolution of regulations shall also be matched with related 
AMC & GM, to ensure operators are able to comply with 
requirements, and to show such compliance to competent 
authorities. In the particular case of Spanish regulation, 
AMC & GM related to the use of SORA to perform safety 
assessment were not published until 9 months after the 
respective regulation, which hindered the authorization 
processes during that elapsed time. This has been 
somewhat balanced because, as early adopters of 
SORA, Spanish operators are already used to this 
methodology and thus better prepared to adapt to the new 
European regulatory frame. 
According to AESA periodic publication of authorized 
operators, by the end of February 2020, only two remote 
operators belonging to Spanish Universities had been 
granted an authorization: DEURPAS-UPV, as mentioned 
before, and CACTI-remote sensing from Vigo university. 
As public research entities, only FADA (Fundación 
Andaluza para el Desarrollo Aeroespacial) and Instituto 
Tecnológico de Canarias are listed. 
This gives a perspective point regarding how important it 
is to develop the operator structure and capabilities, as 
well as the R&D techniques that will make use of UAS 
flights. 
SORA methodology is currently in development, applying 
a primarily qualitative model for the moment. Future 
versions with a cuantitative approach are expected soon, 
enhancing the methodology’s representativeness. A 
critical step of the performed research was the 
coordination of safety assessments with ATSPs, which 
also apply very restrictive criteria. As SORA is still in 
development, with some changing parameters and others 
left to open interpretation, achieving agreement with 
ATSPs has been a difficult task in the process. 
Another aspect to consider is the relatively low risk value 
of the addressed ConOps, limited to SAIL II values. 
Additional research work is being done regarding 
compliance with higher requirements, specially in regard 
to the aircraft design and manufacturing processes. EASA 
has recently developed a design verification process, 
during which operators and manufacturers can 
demonstrate compliance with SAIL III-IV levels. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, an operator management and documentary 
model, based on the output of SORA assessment has 
been detailed and proven valid, enabling the realization of 
complex operations. 
The adoption of these models by R&D entities will 
stimulate a more widespread, less limited, use of UAS, 
which will speed up the development of their possible 
applications. 
Work in this field will keep on, continuously adapting to 
everchanging regulations and the development of new 
standards and technologies. A special field of interest for 
the future is the concept of U-Space or UTM, which 
focuses on the traffic management of unmanned aircraft 
systems and are expected to enable large numbers of 
simultaneous operations. 
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